LESSONS ON A SHELF
Fools, say they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by other people's experience.
-Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898)
The United States has countless organizations that are dedicated to preserving the lessons of the past so that we can avoid the painful mistakes that others made before us. The military is particularly fond of creating "lessons learned" and they are available for review if policy makers or their advisors take the time to review them.
"Lessons learned" do us no good when they remain on the shelf in a dusty binder.
There were lessons from the Vietnam era that may have allowed a less painful experience in Iraq, but only if someone took the time to review what happened in our past. The most important of those lessons was the need to establish unity of effort. This is particularly important when the interagency is involved.
In the cases of Iraq and Vietnam, many of the key agencies involved are the same and that is not likely to change in future conflicts of this nature. An organization that is interagency in nature, like a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), should focus unity of effort rather than to pull it apart. The core of the problem is the different perspective that each of the three largest agencies involved have. The Department of Defense (DOD) is charged with winning the nation's wars. The Department of State (DOS) is charged with conducting diplomacy, largely from the worldwide embassy structure, as well as advising the Department back in Washington as to current atmospherics worldwide. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is officially part of DOS, they certainly view the world in a very different way.
USAID promotes our national interests through foreign aid in the way of development projects around the globe.
In the case of Iraq, DOD is dealing with many issues that seemingly fall outside our doctrinal template. In other words many of the tasks associated with the fight in Iraq do not seem like warfighting. DOD has vast resources and a cultural desire to find quick solutions but quick solutions can often short change the ability of the target audience to learn how to do it themselves. DOS is used to a longer term approach to problems which runs counter to the DOD approach. DOS is also not typically accustomed to working in an active combat zone. USAID typically works through NGOs as implementing partners. They typically charge the NGO with running a program over a longer period of time and may not be flexible enough to adapt the rapidly changing situation in a place like Iraq.
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice inaugurated the first of ten Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq on November 11, 2005 . Just a little more than a year later President Bush announced that ten additional PRTs would be created as part of the "New Way Forward".
1 This paper focuses on how these PRTs were developed and whether or not lessons from Vietnam were thoughtfully considered or should have been.
This paper will focus only on the U.S. PRTs in Iraq. It is important to note that there were PRTs working actively in Afghanistan as the teams in Iraq were formed and that there are also PRTs working in both countries from coalition nations. Additionally, the U.S. has experience with counterinsurgencies in the Philippines, the Greek Civil War, Malaya and others including some in South America. A review of each ongoing approach would be worthwhile but for this paper I will concentrate on the U.S. effort in Iraq.
When committing scarce resources, lessons learned from past operations must be considered, particularly in reference to unity of effort. It seems as though we refuse to look back to the Vietnam experience when considering approaches for today. Did "failure" in Vietnam cause us too completely lose the lessons that should have been gained and applied in future conflicts? It seems that many of the lessons learned from the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program are still useful today and in fact given the division and competition we see in today's interagency process, even more relevant today than when the principles were first applied. History since Vietnam certainly shows that the United States will be forced to deal with counterinsurgencies. We should have learned a great deal in our efforts from that era.
"But, we still do not seem to have profited by many of the operational lessons so expensively learned in Vietnam. One is tempted to recall Santayana's maxim that those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it." 2 The first part of this paper will examine the CORDS program, particularly the difficulties that led up to its establishment and some of the lessons learned. It will examine those lessons for relevancy as applied to the PRT model in Iraq and make suggestions as to how we might do an even better job of setting up interagency teams meant to deal with insurgencies to improve the unity of effort in the future. By no means is the history of the CORDS program in this paper complete as it is only meant to illustrate some of the difficulties that led to the establishment of CORDS. for Presidential signature but perhaps more importantly Komer and Westmoreland set a way forward for the pacification effort that both could support. The American role would remain advisory to the South Vietnamese, there would be a single manager at each level of government that would be the one voice for pacification issues and positions were to be filled by the best person available regardless of whether they were military or civilian. 13 When the President signed the NSAM in May it dramatically shifted the U.S approach to pacification.
The decision of the president to put a civilian deputy under Westmorland was major change in U.S. Policy. He did so for three reasons. The first was that there were so many different U.S. agencies involved in pacification. They were unable to generate efficiency working separately and working loosely with the military was not enough.
Second, the civilian agencies and the military were stepping all over each other at the lower levels where South Vietnamese lower level officials might have several U.S.
advisors giving conflicting advice. Finally, it was understood that the agency with the most resources would not really take this part of the mission seriously unless they were held responsible for its success. Bunker, General Westmorland, newly promoted Ambassador Komer and most of the other key players. One thing that never changes is that good things happen when key leaders get along. There were many military leaders and staff officers who detested Ambassador Komer and his power as a civilian. Komer was known as the "blowtorch"
for his fiery personality. Those who got to know him well often gained a higher opinion as he was as effective as he was abrasive according to BG Denny Roush (USA, Ret.).
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In a May Commander's Conference Westmoreland made it clear to his subordinate commanders that they would support this effort wholeheartedly. While it was not always easy, the support to pacification efforts improved dramatically. Embassy was attempting to reach out to the provinces and local government. There were some regional and provincial teams established by the Coalition Provisional Authority but they had not been empowered or resourced properly. 27 Ambassador
Khalilzad was impressed by the work done by PRTs in Afghanistan during the time he served there and wanted a similar effort in Iraq. 28 What exactly the PRTs were The PRT's initial focus was governance and most actions could be traced back to establishing governance. The simplified definition of governance is a government or structure that meets the expectation of the population to deliver services through a definable process. Under the former Saddam Hussein regime the system was centralized. PRTs had to teach the provincial officials how to think for themselves when serving their constituents. This requires constant interface which was difficult initially due to security considerations. In Baghdad, where we were better resourced than most, missions were often limited to one to two hours on the ground and with only 3-5 missions possible on a good day the interface was minimal in many instances. Consider that the conditions for Iraqi officials were even worse where intimidation through assassination and kidnapping was constant. While the PRT decided who they had to meet, the military unit providing security or the RSO had ultimate control as they approved movements for PRT personnel. Initially teams were interacting at the provincial and district level. Establishing a link between those two levels of government was important. That meant that PRTS really needed to travel through the entire province. The teams were to be made up of primarily civilian personnel. The initial teams With all these problems many things were going well. Where PRT members could get out into the community they were making headway. Individual teams came up with work plans and went to work. Without defined goals and metrics to measure success from above it was often hard to prove that progress but most involved felt that One interviewed PRT member reported that the first PRT team leader was not able to achieve a productive working relationship with the PRT. The interviewee described this particular Department of State (DOS) team leader as having no desire to contribute to unity of effort. As a result, the was disagreement as to what the main effort should be for the Diyala Province until a new DOS PRT leader, with a better understanding of the military culture, brought a cohesive vision to the PRT. leaders, the ePRT team leaders, the Director of OPA and his staff attended. 41 It is interesting to note that several BCT Commanders commented to me on their dismay at having the ePRT team leader attend without them since in their minds the ePRTs worked for them to achieve specific effects in accordance with the plan for their sector.
The C9 had prepared some slides to guide the meeting which went smoothly until a line diagram was shown that attempted to depict who was in charge and how reporting was to take place. 42 Several of the ePRT team leaders began to assert that they worked directly for the Ambassador and even stressed that they did not work for the PRT or military commander that was responsible for dealing with the province or district that they were operating in. This is critical when one considers spheres of influence assignments and common messages at the provincial level. The argument was diffused when LTG Odierno sort of joked it away and had the slide taken down. it was everybody's business and nobody's. Though many correctly analyzed the need for it, and it was from the outset a major component of GVN/U.S. declaratory strategy, the absence of a single agency or directing body charged with it contributed greatly to the prolonged failure to carry it out on any commensurate scale." 43 This quote sums up many issues seen in Iraq and one wonders if any policy maker was familiar with it as the PRT program was born.
If indeed the policy decision is made to change peacetime structures and responsibilities to match wartime requirements in theater, then it is would seem that something different should be considered for the overall management in Washington as well. "If and when an exceptional U.S. supporting effort which cuts across normal agency responsibilities is decided upon, it seems advisable to set up special ad hoc machinery at the Washington level to manage it" 44 The most important point that Komer attaches to this statement is that the ad hoc machinery must be designated by the President and needs the full support of that office to prevail over the interagency backbiting that is sure to follow. Once again, this advice from the Vietnam era is still relevant.
Matching the right person to the available slot is critical and a perfect match in Iraq was rare. Just because someone is a nurse in the U.S. does not qualify that person to advise the provincial health chairman on how to build and staff and train a hospital and that is realistically what was being asked of PRT team members on the ground. The example could be used in almost any sector of government. There were some excellent Rule of Law advisors on the PRTs but being a federal prosecutor does not necessarily qualify someone to teach an entirely different system of law than we use in the U.S. All of these skills would be value added if the incoming expert were given a little mission specific training before arriving in theater. Current DOS training is short and rarely mission specific enough. The DOS is not an organization that is expert in training; in All of this may be a moot point for Iraq but with the current world situation you can expect to see PRT like organizations fielded again in the near future. This paper
does not argue that they should work for DOD. It argues that we should use the experiences of the past to best set our teams up for success. Turf battles in Washington are meaningless to those charged with executing on the ground. The Center for Army
Lessons Learned, the State Department, the United States Institute for Peace, the Special Inspector General for Iraq, the Government Accounting Office and many others are busy documenting how we performed in Iraq. We must recall that after Vietnam we threw counterinsurgency lessons and doctrine out the window. "CORDS was one of the Vietnam War's success stories, and it's well conceived, well executed programs and successful synthesis of civilian and military efforts offer a useful template for current and future COIN operations." 45 We have been involved in many counterinsurgencies since that time and would do well to take the lessons learned from all of these efforts off the shelf and review them from time to time. 
